Introduction
For decades, law-and-literature scholars have demanded more productive engagements between legal theory and literary criticism. Despite this, there have been few dedicated efforts to connect hermeneutics with the study of narratology, which is a branch of literary criticism that can offer useful frameworks for analyzing the language of the law. Few subjects, one knows, are harder to describe than "the complex and tangled process by which what we say-or dotakes on a meaning for another." 2 This truism applies to the interpretation of legal meaning in the common law system.
Historically, the study of narratology has supported the structuralist ambition to isolate and set out the constitutive components of literary texts. 3 The aim has been to understand the system of recurring rules which underlie the construction of literary texts and determine their possible meanings. This article applies insights from structuralist narratology to legal writing in order to reassess longstanding debates about objective interpretation in the common law system. This requires immediate explanation.
expected to read and write authoritative texts in ways that promote the objectively intelligible and accessible meanings of the laws. 10 Framed as such, the imperative of right judgment should not be reduced to legal historical debates about any one "canon of construction," such as that between strict and loose constructionists in constitutional law or over determining the will of the legislatures in statutory interpretation. Rather, the imperative arises more generally from readers' interest in comprehending and complying with rules described by constitutions, statutes, judicial opinions, scholarly articles, and other narratives, the meanings of which are assumed to be objectively intelligible and accessible by elements of the carceral and bureaucratic state in the common law system.
Issues of reader comprehension are fraught with theoretical conflict. Literary and legal hermeneutical scholars have vigorously debated the sources of textual meaning for decades. 11 On the one side are objective interpretivists, the principal supporter being E.D. Hirsch. He argues that meaning is determined by the author's psychic acts, or authorial intent, which readers may reproduce by reconstructing the historical assumptions that defined the author's intentions at the time of writing. 12 Hirsch explains that one of these historical assumptions is generic appropriateness, such that "if the text follows the conventions of a scientific essay … it is inappropriate to construe the kind of allusive meaning found in casual conversation." 13 This tracks an idea in genre theory that authors can predetermine readers' engagement with literary texts by invoking formal and structural conventions which dictate the terms of the author-narrator-reader relation. For example, authors create characters or personae characterized by mood, tone, voice, and diction by means of narration. Texts define their readership based on the qualities their readers are expected to have, which should be reflected by the manner in which the texts' narrators address them.
14 By invoking these conventions, Hirsch argues that the authors' achievement of generic appropriateness gives rise to verifiable indicia of meaning, including the narrators' social, political, or legal suggestions, the authors' stated views on a relevant subject, the historical context of the texts' publication, as well as popular assessments of the texts' quality.
In the legal academy, one of the most prominent objective interpretivists is Owen Fiss. He describes adjudication as the "process by which a judge comes to understand and express the meaning of an authoritative legal text and the values embodied in that text." 15 As stated here, Fiss aspires for judges to find "the" meaning of an authoritative legal text (rather than "a" or multiple meanings) and "the" values "embodied" there. This meaning and these values are unitary, preexisting the interpretive act, and, if not immanent in the text itself or an external textual source, at least transcending the particular standpoints of individual readers. Fiss argues that it is possible to read legal texts and find objective meanings because the interpretive act is defined by a set of "disciplining rules" shared by a community committed to the rule of law. Specifically, "[the reader] is disciplined by a set of rules that specify the relevance and weight to be assigned to the material (e.g., words, history, intention, consequence) as well as those that define the basic concepts and that established the procedural circumstances under which the interpretation must occur." 16 On the other side of the debate are subjective interpretivists, many of whom are reader-response critics arguing that interpretations are dependent on the unique perspectives that readers bring to bear. 17 This theory is championed by 14. See, e.g., Robert M Cover, "Nomos and Narrative" (1983) (1984) 97 Harv L Rev 4 at 10 (arguing that the intelligibility of written forms is derived in the communal character of narratives, locating them in a "common script"). 15. Fiss, supra note 11 at 739. See also Earl Maltz, "The Failure of Attacks on Constitutional Originalism" (1987) 4 Constitutional Commentary 43. 16. Fiss, supra note 11 at 744. Dennis Klinck describes the orthography of such an approach, stating that authoritative legal texts intend to adopt conventional language which should correspond to real classes of things in nature, such that it is possible to read these texts and settle on "valid" interpretations that are objectively intelligible and accessible to authors and readers. See Dennis R Klinck, The Word of the Law: Approaches to Legal Discourse (Carleton University Press, 1992) at 9 (explaining that while different languages may adopt different linguistic conventions, the assumption is that authors' intended meanings should be perfectly translatable and readings of texts are secure). ("The reader can decide to forgive, to acquit, to morally, religiously, legally condemn the hero and all the other characters in the eternal life, in the abstract literary world that reading constitutes, or in the fiction determined by the discourse.
[…] There are no limits to how the reader can judge.").
Roland Barthes 18 and Jacques Derrida 19 who stand opposed to Hirsch's position that a text has only one meaning instead of multiple meanings depending on the readers' historical conventions. The subjectivists hold that comprehension is a politically determined process that is incapable of producing objectivity as if addressing some pure and pre-existing reality. 20 Theorizing in a similar vein about interpretive consciousness, Hans-Georg Gadamer suggests that all readers live within shifting cultural traditions that inculcate them with unique and individual "prejudices." 21 These limit what readers can perceive, as if on a horizon: "the range of vision that includes everything that can be seen from a particular vantage point."
22
In writing about the law, the most influential subjective interpretivist is Stanley Fish. He argues that it is futile to search for one "true" or "verifi- (summarizing the poststructuralist theory of the "text"). 19. Derrida's "logic of the supplements" is that an act of writing (a signifier) is a mediation for speech (also a signifier), filling in as its crude and unequal substitute when speech is absent. Speech, in turn, is a mediation for some unmediated thing-in this case, objectively intelligible and accessible meaning (the purported signified). His claim is that if this unmediated thing must be self-sufficient, it could not be accurately represented by a sign. Thus, we are left with a series of representations of representations ad infinitum, and the purported signified is actually a signifier in disguise that may be subjectively interpreted. interpretive communities will adopt different hermeneutical practices, readers will interpret texts as well as Fiss's own "disciplining rules" purporting to govern their interpretation in a manner ultimately generated by social, cultural, and political power. 24 As such, meanings in law are subjective, contextual, and conferred on texts from the outside.
25
Subjective interpretivism has a practical problem that it cannot solve. How should readers reconcile the claim that texts have multiple meanings with the readers' lived reality, in many cases, that requires them to comprehend and comply with only one? Ronald Dworkin assessed such a task when engaged in the "special enterprise" of interpreting authoritative literary and legal texts, using Agatha Christie's crime novel The Murder of Roger Ackroyd 26 as an example.
Suppose we distinguish between truth within a special game or enterprise and real or objective truth outside it. Taking fiction as a model, we might say that within the enterprise of a certain story someone killed Roger Ackroyd. But in the real world, outside that enterprise, Roger Ackroyd never existed, so that it cannot be true that anyone killed him. We might want to conceive the social practices of morality, art, law, and interpretation in some such way. Within the enterprise we make arguments and have beliefs of a certain sort-that slavery is unjust, for example, or that Christie novels display a certain view of evil. if subjective interpretivists deconstruct the idea that one can access the objective meanings of authoritative texts, should readers then interpret these texts in wildly divergent ways, it would work against the readers' interests and the texts would work against their own purposes to promote comprehension and compliance.
29
Richard Weisberg explains that "few texts have a discernible meaning, and even then perhaps for only a few readers, but many texts display a discernible desire to be understood a certain way." 30 In other words, while the texts may not mean anything essentially true, they are clearly expected to mean something correct in literary and legal jurisdictions organized around their shared production and consumption. 31 This means that readers' effort to make the right judgment about authoritative texts-to "play the game" in Dworkin's words-may still provide the nominal structure for hermeneutical claims of this kind. Readers can make the right judgment by approaching texts initially according to the uses to which they are put by their enforcers, rather than by asking how the texts could or should be put due to a normative concern. It may be theoretically unsound in a subjectively deconstructed world, but the strategy promotes improved reading comprehension and compliance when authors, readers, and enforcement powers share its consequentialist outlook.
Further to this strategy, authors and readers should adopt specific interpretive methods for the meanings of literary and legal texts to be interpreted correctly. At a minimum, authors should write a complete and faithful account of events (or something aspiring to it) without any lies or significant omissions which detract from the right meanings. As Fish explains, authors and readers should belong to the same interpretive communities in which their constructed assumptions about the texts are shared. 32 To use Wayne Booth's seminal definition from narrative theory, authors, narrators, and readers should ascribe to the same intellectual, emotional, moral, and ethical norms affecting how they see the world, experience language, and relate to the texts. 33 Where these conditions are present, the narratives are said to be "reliable." 34 Reliability may be easiest to achieve in fiction when first person or third person narrators are omniscient, when they occupy a non-locatable, indeterminate position exterior to and above their narrated universes, and when they represent their implied authors' views honestly and forthrightly. 35 Reliability can also be Whether speaking in the first person or third person, in fiction or non-fiction, narrators' three main roles are interpreting, reporting, and evaluating. 37 Where narrators misread or fail to read part of a story, misreport or fail to report part of a story, or misjudge or fail to judge part of a story, they become "unreliable." 38 Theresa Heyd explains that unreliable narrators may be differentiated along the axis of intentionality or self-consciousness. 39 At one pole, there are narrators ignorant of the frailty of their thinking or language. They are unreliable despite themselves, telling a false or incomplete story because they lack the self-awareness or capacity to order events rightly. At the other pole, there are narrators who know their stories have the potential to deceive and write unreliably to further their own or their authors' private interests. They often exploit popular assumptions about what readers are thinking. They can obscure their true actions by making false utterances, omitting relevant and material information, or keeping "covert," "effaced," "non-intrusive," or "non-dramatized" in literary criticism. David Lodge argues that the prospect of an "omniscient unreliable" narrator may be a contradiction in terms because it is difficult to conceive how a narrator could be all-knowing, and therefore incapable of observing, reporting, or evaluating badly, and consciously or unconsciously evasive at the same time. Lodge suggests that such a narrator could only figure in a very "deviant, 36. Correspondingly, the internal or external focalized narrator is called "overt," "intrusive," or "dramatized" in literary criticism. Such a narrator may be "heterodiegetic," meaning not a character in the story she narrates, or "homodiegetic," meaning a character in the story she narrates. See generally Genette, supra note 35 at 245; Gerald Prince, "Narratology" vague about issues salient to the correct meanings. If their unreliability is only exposed after readers' have begun to understand their texts, the revelation of their exposure throws a wrench in readers' comprehension process, shifting the frames of reference that the narrators themselves helped to fix and forcing readers to reconsider what the correct meanings really are. This raises crucial questions for debates about law. Could authoritative legal texts feature unreliable narration? Could poor narrative qualities defeat readers' ability to access the correct meanings of the texts? Given the threat that unreliability poses, how should authors and readers modulate their interpretive processes of writing and reading, as well as their respective roles in the common law system more broadly? These issues should concern anyone who writes, reads, or enforces legal prescriptions in the carceral or bureaucratic state. 40 In practice, unreliable could mean unusable in a litigation context, or at least useless to cite as objective authority. For most readers, comprehending and complying with the right meanings of legal texts is a practical imperative that carries serious penalties for non-compliance. For the legal system to function as it should and for these meanings to be intelligible and accessible to readers, the texts should feature reliable narration. Through a close reading of two texts in the following sections, this article shows that there are times when this is not the case.
Part II: Detecting Meaning in Crime Fictions
There may be no more closely examined work in the unreliability canon than Christie's The Murder of Roger Ackroyd, one of the most pure and accessible examples of unreliable narration in crime fiction. 41 Numerous studies in the humanities have used the novel to address the theoretical issues raised by its singular narrative construction.
42 As Dworkin's work illustrates, the novel is equally wellsuited to legal analysis for its demonstrating the instructive analogy between crime fiction and legal non-fiction, including judicial opinions, given the conventions of both genres which define the reading of representative texts as special interpretive enterprises. 43 The novel is particularly useful for its demonstration of unreliability as a narrative technique, including formal and structural qualities that may be operative in a wide range of social, political, and legal contexts. 44 Readers enjoy a largely trusting relationship with crime fiction authors who are generally expected to operate within well-established narrative conventions. At the highest, the novels typically follow a linear plot trajectory through the discovery of the illegal act, investigation by the detective, and unmasking of the guilty party. Neil Sargent describes their constitution as the "history of a progressive unfolding of the meaning of a series of mysterious events, usually involving a limited number of protagonists in a confined temporal and spatial setting, in search of the underlying causal principles behind the mystery." 45 The circumstances of the crime must be explicable in terms of the solution provided. 46 More evocatively, Cecil Day-Lewis considers their stories to be as highly formalized as religious ritual, noting parallels between their denouement and the Christian Day of Judgment "when with a flourish of trumpets, the mystery is made plain and the goats are separated from the sheep." 47 In this way, crime fictions are distinct from other fictions that are intransitive or otherwise unconcerned with establishing the correctness of objective propositions through the collection of evidence and making of rational arguments. 48 The plots may twist and turn, chasing down false leads contrived by the perpetrators, but they should ultimately foreclose every possibility other than the right one in the end: whodunit. Inconsistent explanations can only be wrong. 49 As such, readers'
44. It is a frequent criticism of law-and-literature scholarship that much of it lacks a principled methodology for selecting certain literary sources over others from which to draw insight about the legal process. See, e.g., Jane B Baron, "Law, Literature, and the Problems of Interdisciplinarity" 
49.
Occasionally in crime fiction, after the detective has revealed the unambiguously correct solution to readers, he or she gives an alternative explanation to police on account of some higher imperative, usually to spare the surviving victim continued hardship or the murderer undeserved punishment. This explanation is usually accepted by the police because the detective has strategically withheld certain facts. In such cases, readers are almost always in on the deception which does not challenge the certainty of the correct solution-that is, the solution which the narrator intends the readers to perceive as the right one-unless the narrative is unreliable. One of the best known examples of such a story is Agatha Christie, Murder on the Orient Express (Harper Collins, 1934 engagement with the texts resembles an hermeneutical search for objectively intelligible and accessible meaning. 50 Readers expect crime fictions to avoid interpretive crises, deliver on their generic promise, and provide a remedy in the form of characters' confessions or convictions.
The subgenre of "Classical" crime fiction invokes specific narrative content that is characteristic of Christie's novels from the interwar period. 51 The setting is usually an idealized, remote, and hermetically-sealed English village, focusing on a country house. The brilliant amateur detective either resides in the area, vacations there, or arrives in response to an urgent summons. The murder victim is typically an undesirable patriarch, perhaps a member of the squirearchy, whose body should be relatively bloodless. There should be a finite cast of suspects representing a cross-section of village society. There is usually a young and plucky heroine, possibly the daughter of the squire, who is romantically involved with an athletic gentleman bachelor. There may be one or more gossipy spinsters able to parlay information told to them by an impressionable and well-connected maid. A professional man, often a lawyer or doctor, as well as a member of the military will figure frequently. The butler of the house must listen at doors. And a suspicious stranger, usually a "hot-blooded" Mediterranean foreigner, may be found lurking around the victim's estate. All suspects should have a motive for the killing, none should have a watertight alibi, and as many as possible should be hiding something, usually resentment, anger, or lust simmering beneath the surface of village gentility.
52 At novel's end, the detective should catch the killer and excise him from the community as an aberration from the norm so that the innocent are cleared and status quo is restored as something intrinsically worth preserving.
53
Roger Ackroyd is prototypical for its fitting so neatly within this conventional milieu. It features a wealthy and undesirable patriarch, Ackroyd, who is 50. See Bayard, supra note 42 at 83. 51. The subgenre of Classical crime fiction, first popularized and closely associated with the interwar period in Britain, is alternately termed the "Golden Age," "clue-puzzle," or "whodunit" subgenre in literary criticism. There is a young and plucky heroine, the patriarch's niece, and two gentlemen bachelors considered as her possible suitors. There are also at least three eavesdropping servants, two gossipy spinsters, one attending doctor, a major in the military, and a dark and mysterious stranger whose late night rendezvous at the crime scene cannot be explained. Events progress logically from the discovery of Ackroyd's body through Poirot's investigation of the crime, which generates several leads because so many people stand to benefit from Ackroyd's death. Eventually, Poirot identifies the culprit and convinces him to commit suicide in an act of atonement and, by so doing, the dangerous aberrational forces of selfishness, greed, paranoia, and violence that marked his impulsive nature and threatened to blight respectable society are diffused as well. Unusually, the regular chronicler of Poirot's adventures, Captain Hastings, is visiting South America when Poirot is in King's Abbot, so the task falls upon someone unknown to Christie's readers, the local physician James Sheppard, to narrate the story. Facts are recounted chronologically through Sheppard's first person, imperfect, homodiegetic narration, such that readers' only insight on the fictional world is filtered through the language of his selective, subjective mental experience. However, readers are unwise to impute the general reliability of Hastings's narratives onto Sheppard's because readers discover at novel's end that Sheppard has deliberately omitted details along the way, including his whereabouts at certain times, his motivations for acting, and his role in Ackroyd's murder and subsequent cover-up. As Poirot puts it after Sheppard's unreliability is exposed, Sheppard's narration "is strictly truthful as far as it went, but it did not go very far." 54 Pierre Bayard argues that one of the formal mechanisms creating an impression of reliability in the novel is "double-edged discourse," or narration replete with statements that offer two possible but contradictory meanings in the text. 55 This is exemplified by Sheppard's description of his meeting with Ackroyd on the night of the murder, also the most famous passage in the novel:
The letter had been brought in at twenty minutes to nine. It was just on ten minutes to nine when I left him, the letter still unread. I hesitated with my hand on the door handle, looking back and wondering if there was anything I had left undone. I could think of nothing. With a shake of the head I passed out and closed the door behind me.
56
Sheppard's story is not false, strictly speaking, but it obscures important facts that pertain to the correct interpretation. Offstage, in the ten minutes elapsing between the first and second sentences, Sheppard plunges a dagger into Ackroyd's neck. Later in the novel, he goads us to consider the passage in a new light: 57 The lines which follow mislead in a similar way, as Sheppard's statement, "I hesitated with my hand on the door handle, looking back and wondering if there was anything I had left undone," is so vague as to signify multiply. Readers eventually interpret the right meaning that Sheppard is reflecting on whether he hid the evidence of his crime, 58 but not before most of them will have initially interpreted a wrong meaning, consistent with Sheppard's innocence, because they are taken in by his personality and appearance of genuine feeling.
Readers' views are cemented by Sheppard's tone and approach. He tells a dramatic story in an undramatic manner, recalling shocking facts of murder, illegitimacy, drug addiction, and suicide with a calm and mechanistic language that elides unpredictable expressive feeling. Stephen Knight suggests that in so narrating, "[e]motion is removed and takes incredulity with it." Sheppard's style further reflects a bourgeois sentimentality shared by a class of Christie's readers in the interwar period, generating a sense of closeness and immediacy between the narrator and his audience by creating a model of respectable confidence that is a valid means of interpreting events in the story. 59 Sheppard is also the only character with whom readers have continuous contact and to whom they believe they have unfiltered access, suggesting cooperation and shared humanity no matter how problematic Sheppard's character turns out to be. 60 In these ways, the murderer is disguised by the process of narration itself, in the form of a trustworthy voice that relates the story as if detached from events and existing in externally defined relation.
61 Situating Sheppard's identity behind the narrative "I" makes him at once invisible but still in plain view, seen from the outside through readers' interpretive consciousness and from the inside through the language of Sheppard's sympathetic perspective, such that most readers fail to appreciate they are seeing the world through the eyes of a killer.
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The primary structural mechanism creating an impression of reliability in the novel is the dual communicative framework between Christie and crime fiction readers. This informs the generic conventions of novels that she wrote and the conventions of novels that her readers expect to read. Sheppard is situated in a place of ostensible authority as the narrator, a role which long carried with it a presumption of innocence in crime fiction. The presumption is rooted in what Sargent explains to be the operative principle behind the narrator-detective's method: "that the past is complete and exists in an already defined relation to the present." 63 This allows narrators to distance themselves from other characters in the story, attaining the privileged position of authoritative observers who are able to cognitively organize and communicate events accurately. 64 If not one step ahead of the criminals, narrators should at least be able to deduce the criminals' identities as readers are. 65 This translates into a tacit understanding between authors and readers that their engagement with the texts is really a game of wits, played fairly, to reach the right judgment from clues that are communicated honestly and forthrightly by narrators who are above suspicion. If narrators were to misinform readers along the way, the constitutive premise of the reading experience would be flawed. Readers assume that narrators are recounting events reliably because otherwise they could barely follow the stories, let alone make a sensible guess at the solutions.
66
Roger Ackroyd caused a great furor when it was published. Many critics cried foul at the revelation of the narrator-murderer, calling the device "unfair," "unforgiveable," and most colourfully by S. S. Van Dine, "as insidious as offering someone a bright penny for a five dollar gold piece." 67 They were upset that Christie had changed the rules of the reading game, the conventional contract Sketch called Christie's gambit a "tasteless, unforgiveable let-down by a writer we had grown to admire." One irate reader, a doctor like Sheppard, wrote to The Times: "Until now I have always been a great admirer of Agatha Christie but in the latest book I feel she has let the whole of the medical profession down and therefore propose in the future not to buy any more of her books." Throughout her life, Christie defended the novel from critics who challenged her device of the narrator-murderer. As she explained to Francis Wyndham: "I have a certain amount of rules. No false words must be uttered by me. To write 'Mrs. Armstrong walked home wondering who had committed the murder' would be unfair if she had done it herself. But it's not unfair to leave things out. In Roger Ackroyd I made the narrator write: 'It was just on ten minutes to nine when I left him.' There's lack of explanation there, but no false statement. Whoever my villain is it has to be someone I feel could do the murder." Dorothy Sayers, a contemporary of Christie's and some-considered rival, defended her in public by saying, "Fair! And Fooled you … it's the reader's business to suspect everybody." For full accounts of these and other critics' responses to the novel at the time of its publication, see Gwen Robyns, between herself and her audience, unilaterally and without notice. They discovered too late that readers' challenge in the novel is to find the solution from clues provided honestly but not forthrightly, in a narrative that is inconspicuous from a formal and structural perspective. 68 Christie's offense was not in publishing a story that had multiple meanings or no meaning at all, but constructing a narrative that unfairly impeded readers' access to the correct meaning in light of the traditional prohibition against narrator-murderers in crime fiction. This suggests that most readers accept the correctness of Sheppard's identification as the murderer within the terms of the narrative. It appears the combined regulatory forces of Christie's claims to generic appropriateness, the novel's conventional characteristics, and readers' investment in solving the crime are so powerful that they determine readers' legitimate belief that Sheppard's confession is reliable after the fact of his unreliability is exposed. The novel's final chapter is even entitled "Apologia," suggesting that Sheppard confesses to his narrative crimes that have been isolated to the unreliable "pre-revelation" text alone.
What if readers are undeservedly trusting to accept that Sheppard's pre-revelation statements are his only crimes against correctness and not his "post-revelation" statements as well? The powerful destabilizing effect of unreliable narration should cast doubt on the quality of the entire representation, leading readers to wonder whether Sheppard's apology, while appearing to foreclose meaning, may in fact be his most ingenious concealment. The fact that Sheppard is implicated in Ackroyd's murder effectively damages his credibility, laying the text threadbare and marking the whole story with a degree of uncertainty and taint of possible deception. His stating now appears fragile, his language inadequate to describe his true inner thoughts and feelings, let alone what really happened in King's Abbot.
To illustrate, Bayard argues that Sheppard's apology reads ambiguously enough to allow more than one credible interpretation. 69 Sheppard's comment, "I suppose I must have meant to murder him all along," relays his "supposed" intention to kill without admitting to the actual killing.
70 Another comment-"I'd brought a handy little weapon of my own, but when I saw the dagger lying in the silver table, it occurred to me at once how much better it would be to use a weapon that couldn't be traced to me"-considers the merits of various murder weapons without admitting to having used one. 71 Whatever these and other statements signify, they are part of a post-revelation narrative that cannot be read independently of other deliberate disarrangements in the text. Readers should assume that all Sheppard's signs have double edges, supplying the point of departure for more than one intelligible and accessible meaning.
Bayard theorizes on this basis and argues that the evidence Sheppard relies upon to incriminate himself in the post-revelation text may figure in any number of different solutions that are equally plausible as Sheppard's confession of guilt. Among them, he suggests that Caroline Sheppard murders Ackroyd in order to protect her brother from an accusation of blackmail and that Sheppard leaves behind a false confession in order to protect his sister. 72 This solution is appealing in its simplicity and uncontradicted by the pre-revelation facts. But the key significance is not the solution's superiority to Sheppard's confession, but the possibility of its credibly signifying from the narrative at all. Any pretension that there exists objectively intelligible and accessible meaning to be found in Roger Ackroyd, already destabilized by the fact of unreliable narration, is shattered if we accept the verisimilitude of alternative meanings. As Jonathan Culler explains in respect of unreliability, "[a]t the moment when we propose that a text means something other than what it appears to say, we introduce, as hermeneutic devices, which are supposed to lead us to the truth of the text, models which are based on our expectations about the text and the world."
See Heyd
73 Put another way, Sheppard's deviance breaks the boundaries of the narrative wide open. There is nothing to prevent other readers from inserting Sheppard's rows of stars on its pages, between sentences or even within words, to interpret the text through their own frames of reference. Knowingly or not, Christie was an early progenitor of subjective interpretivism and her critics were unprepared. This was not supposed to happen in this genre, in this way, and it raises important questions about the stability of analogous texts in other genres, including law.
Part III: Deciding Meaning in Judicial Opinions
As explained above, a common view about fiction is that its reliability flows from the narrators' omniscience or exteriority to the narrated world. 74 It follows that, with the benefit of such an unlimited perspective, it is easier to narrate a complete and accurate account of events free of lies or significant omissions detracting from the right meaning. A common view about non-fiction, with a few notable exceptions, 75 is its reliability also flows from exteriority to the narrated world. Of course, omniscience cannot be achieved in reality, but may be compensated for in non-fiction by the narrators' honest intentions, diligent research, or at least some benefit of critical hindsight. Again it follows that, with the benefit of such measures, it is easier to narrate a complete and accurate account of events without lies or significant omissions detracting from the right meaning.
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Generic labels such as "non-fiction," not unlike "crime fiction," may depend on narrators attempting to report the facts in a reliable way. Otherwise, the constitutive premise of many readers' engagement with the texts-instruction, enlightenment, reflection, or some other-would be flawed. Yet defined with that aim, reliability in non-fiction cannot be definitively assured. Authors of non-fiction cognitively organize events and communicate them into stories in the same way that authors of fiction do, which means that both fiction and non-fiction can be the province of unreliability. This will happen when authors and readers interpret works in accordance with different interpretive community affiliations or intellectual, emotional, moral, and ethical norms. 77 This observation applies equally to the special enterprise of interpreting the meanings of certain legal non-fictions, including constitutions, statutes, judicial opinions, and scholarly articles, the meanings of which are assumed to be objectively intelligible and accessible by elements of the carceral and bureaucratic state.
If one takes a narratological approach to legal non-fiction, similar to crime fiction, one takes up the structuralist ambition to understand the constitutive components that underlie and comprise authoritative texts, including the ways that storytelling gives shape to interpreted events. 78 More specifically, the approach reveals how authorial processes are inevitably informed by the narrators' unique perspectives on what information is pertinent and how best to construct the resulting narratives that describe laws. 79 Given the risk that readers will interpret legal non-fictions in the wrong way, their authors face immense pressures to convey meanings as clearly and unambiguously as possible. This is achieved in the subgenre of judicial opinions by means of an institutionally-imposed consensus about how opinions should be composed. should be monologic, telling a story without awaiting a response. 81 Judicial methodology should be interrogative, guided by the "question that judges decide to accept as the basis of their deliberations."
82 Judicial tone should be declarative, "reaching down from above in a way that can be accepted from below." 83 Judicial rhetoric should impress what Booth and other rhetoricians call "ethical appeal," that is, cement the impression that judges are the kind of people who ought to be believed. 84 These conventions require writing in a manner that suppresses any recognizable identity suggesting freedom of choice in the moment of decision, "as if forced to an inevitable conclusion by the logic of the situation and the duties of office, which together eliminate all thought of an unfettered hand." 85 The overall effect should be that judges make decisions collectively and impersonally, as if it is the rule of law speaking rather than one person speaking, with a line of sight that approaches omniscience. 86 The impositions may be greatest on judges deciding cases that reverberate loudest in the law and media, for which the Supreme Court of Canada and other courts have reserved the option of issuing reasons per curiam, or "By the Court," literally dissolving the judges' unique and individual identities into one unanimous, anonymous, authoritative voice.
87
With respect to narrative structure, legal readers expect judicial opinions to follow a highly formalized, linear plot trajectory, proceeding through the statement . Klinck remarks on the general reluctance of judges to use the personal pronoun "I" in their formal writing because they feel it is inappropriate that judges should manifest "personal" perspectives. He concludes that unlike an omniscient narrator in fiction, the judge has an interest in how the legal case unfolds and therefore becomes a character in the story herself. See Klinck, supra note 16 at 307. 87. Per curiam reasons by the Supreme Court of Canada are rare. They are typically reserved for cases with exceptional implications, a high public profile, or great potential for controversy. of the facts, framing of the issues, statement of the law, and making of the decision. 88 Writing opinions resembles the near-mechanical act of reviewing evidence admitted only for relevance and materiality. 89 The facts must be determinable with some degree of certainty in order for opinions to appear legitimate to their normal audience of persons trained in law. 90 This culminates the hermeneutical search for meaning in the story, foreclosing interpretations other than the correct version of what really happened, how the law applies, and what must legally result from it.
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Judicial resolutions are mapped and rigorously enforced because appellate opinions stand as precedents for the application of the same rules in analogous law cases.
92 Stories with similar beginnings should have similar endings, fulfilling the courts' primary obligation to maintain continuity without which the rule of law would not be rooted in durable principles. 93 Appeal courts exist to discipline errant courts below, having the power to reinterpret facts and law and to rewrite the endings of stories which deviate from generic conventions. Peter Brooks argues that U.S. Supreme Court decisions make this power most explicit, typically concluding "It is so ordered" as if to declare the Court has communicated a narrative of (law and) order and given contested events a single, reducible, unambiguous meaning. 94 In this way, judicial opinions imply more than the conclusion of individual disputes, but the existence of group values, the upholding of objectively intelligible and accessible meanings that are the fundamental and practice-based desiderata of the common law system. These formal and structural conventions activate readers' impressions that judicial opinions are reliable, and the implications of unreliable narration in this context are grave. If trial judges were to misinform readers by imagining, confusing, or omitting relevant and material information and this was later exposed, readers would perceive there to be unfairness in the process, error in the reasoning, or injustice in the results. If widespread, this perception would create public Hastings LJ 697 at 697 (arguing that while "the traditional assumption has been that the primary purpose of adjudication is truthseeking," concerned with the accurate and orderly evaluation of disputed facts and past events, "this premise has been challenged by a variety of scholars proposing alternative purposes"). 90. Cavallaro, supra note 47 at 648. 91. To appropriate Knight's description of crime fiction that is equally applicable in this context, judicial resolutions are "consistent, often highly artificial and deeply comforting." See Knight, supra note 42 at 125. 92. See Biet, supra note 17 at 416-17. Biet explores the functions and truth value of what he calls "legal fictions," meaning the value of an external rule that permits readers (or judges) to make a decision, and "judicial fictions," meaning the narrative which weaves legal fictions and literary elements into a persuasive document (e.g., a factum). Biet distinguishes legal fictions and judicial fictions from "real court judgments," which he does not expressly classify as "non-fictions" as this article does, but which he agrees function as authorities for the specific application of "legal fictions" to specific facts. 93. See Klinck, supra note 16 at 297. 94. Brooks, "Narrativity," supra note 78 at 8; Peter Brooks, "Law and Humanities: Two Attempts" (2013) 93:4 BUL Rev 1437 at 1462-63.
skepticism about the legitimacy of other judicial outcomes. 95 Accordingly, it is exceedingly rare for judges to deviate from the traditional model while serving in their professional capacity by either revealing that they were unreliable by design in the most unusual and subversive case, or admitting that they made honest errors on account of their personal shortcomings rather than legal and institutional factors outside of their control.
96 Such revelations should be managed carefully or else they risk undermining the authority of the common law.
These issues are brought into focus by an extraordinary decision of the Ontario High Court, R v. Lodge, 97 in which the accused was charged and ultimately convicted of sexual assault under section 271(1) of the Criminal Code.
98 The text's narrative construction has been overlooked by legal scholars until now, as Lodge has never, by the date of writing, been cited in subsequent case law or secondary legal sources readily available in Canada or the United States. The author of the opinion, Justice Neele, narrates the facts of the case in the following manner:
[1] The complainant ("D.D.") is an 18 year old female. Mr. Robert "Bob" Lodge ("Mr. Lodge") had met the complainant while she was working as a prostitute in the Silvertown neighbourhood of Niagara Falls, Ontario. Mr. Lodge testified at trial that he contacted the complainant on March 10, 1987 and that she had agreed to go to his home that evening to celebrate his finding a job. They agreed she would take a taxi and he would buy her a 26 ounce bottle of tequila. 
95.
Alan Dershowitz argues that if we "import the narrative form of storytelling into our legal system, we confuse fiction with fact and endanger the truth-finding function of the adjudication process." See Alan M Dershowitz, "Life is Not a Dramatic Narrative" in Brooks & Gerwitz, supra note 78 at 99, 101. Similarly, the Canadian Judicial Council stresses in its ethical guidance to federally appointed judges that, given the independence accorded to judges, they share a collective responsibility to promote a certain standard of conduct: "The rule of law and the independence of the judiciary depend primarily upon public confidence. Justice Neele makes an interesting hermeneutical study for the implications of her choice to narrate the facts in two distinct movements: paragraphs one to seven, and paragraphs ten to thirteen. In paragraphs one to seven, she provides an incomplete version of the facts. Like Sheppard's pre-revelation text in Roger Ackroyd, these paragraphs are highly inconspicuous from a stylistic perspective, telling a dramatic story in an undramatic manner with neutral language and few unnecessary details. This conforms to readers' expectations about how such factual summaries should read. In paragraph eight, Justice Neele writes "Those are the facts of this case," with the backward-looking adjective "those" cementing readers' impressions that her factual summary was completed in paragraphs one to seven. This bridges to her next statement, "The sole issue is whether or not…," using conventional syntax to frame the legal question as typically follows the completed factual summary in a judicial opinion. This sets up Justice Neele's stunning revelation in paragraph nine that she withheld relevant and material evidence in the preceding summary, which she explains is "Mr. Lodge's version" of the facts offered in his own defence. Like Sheppard's own version, Justice Neele's recounting of it "is strictly truthful as far as it went, but it did not go very far."
100 Paragraph nine functions in the same way as Sheppard's apology: Justice Neele admits to her omitting "additional important facts" in the pre-revelation text and attempts to reassert her authority in the post-revelation text, emphatically letting readers know that she "was not taken in" by Mr. Lodge's attempt at deception. She then cites the "additional important facts" in paragraphs ten to thirteen that bear on the legal question and support her subsequent finding-one of the correct meanings of the text-that Mr. Lodge is guilty of sexual assault for the reasons provided.
How will the Lodge opinion be interpreted by its normal audience of lawyers, judges, legislators, constituents, and commentators who are more or less distant from Justice Neele, or more or less distant from one another, because they have different interpretive community affiliations or ascribe to different intellectual, emotional, moral, or ethical norms? Lodge's mispositioned narrative sequence reveals that which the conventional edifice of judicial opinions is intended to conceal: their vulnerability to subjective interpretation.
While Justice Neele occupies the privileged position of an authoritative observer, she is still an unreliable narrator. If her language signifies ambiguously, incompletely, or incorrectly in paragraphs one to nine, it may do so elsewhere. That Justice Neele deliberately misleads readers by her placement of paragraphs ten to thirteen may be improbable, to be fair. After she cites the additional facts, her narration proceeds in the ordinary course through her statement of the law and making of the decision. She never mentions "Mr. Lodge's version" of the facts again or gives any reason for her prior mispositioning, which may not have been done with any specific political or ulterior motive. Regardless, Justice Neele's opinion, as Angela Fernandez describes about another unconventional case, "subverts any attempt to establish an authoritative meaning or to turn a necessarily fluid and multi-faceted artifact into a hard object." 101 The opinion does so by exposing the potential that unreliability can feature in her judgments for whatever reason-self-conscious design, unconscious error, or factors outside her control-casting doubt, for legal readers, on the objectively intelligible and accessible quality of her interpretive processes generally. 102 This means readers who believe Lodge to be a straightforward statement of the criminal law have been "taken in" by Justice Neele's concealment of misdirection: they would have interpreted as law what should really have been interpreted as an unreliable work of crime fiction. No wonder the case has been overlooked until now.
The narrative form and structure of judicial writing, like crime fiction writing, imitate objects that can be verifiably cited about happenings in the past. They may impress "mere appearances" of reliability, but they cannot undermine the kind of facts to which the subjective interpretivist critique appeals. At bottom, judges are story-tellers who must invariably focalize events through the social, cultural, and political lens of their narrative ordering processes. 103 When judges hear conflicting testimony or legal submissions at trial, their reactions are a composite of unique and individual prejudices shared by members of their interpretive communities, rarely known in advance or admitted in their reasons, which may or may not accord with the most widely-accepted or prescribed version of events that occurred. And the reasons themselves will always provide the intellectual, emotional, moral, or ethical basis for multiple, divergent interpretations of their form and content. This is true so long as there remain interpretive community outsiders who bring different constructed assumptions about what judicial opinions should mean or interpretive community insiders who bring different narrative ordering purposes, perspectives, and practices to bear than what readers traditionally expect of them. This means that judicial opinions can be read as saying something fundamentally at variance with, and possibly subversive of, the way they were intended by their authors or the way they are interpreted by their enforcers.
There is no objective meaning of the facts in Lodge. There can be no objective meaning of the facts in other cases narrated by judges who wield the same limited power as Justice Neele. 104 There are only social, cultural, and political effects, felt in a multitude of ways, plotted and perpetuated in disparate judicial decisions, in potentially conflicting readings and reinventions of legal history.
Robin West and other scholars have argued against a similar conclusion, stating that analogies of literature to law can be reckless and misplaced because legal adjudication is not an interpretive act, but in its exercise of social, cultural, and political will, an imperative one. West would concede subjective interpretivists the power to make meaning in fictional worlds, but not at the expense of critical complacency about the power of judges to make commands in reality: "We must recognize power when we see it, and we cannot afford to trivialize the discovery by insisting that we see it everywhere." Judicial excellence is defined, in large part, by judges' performance in their writing. Professional standards should expand to include the attempted reliability of judicial opinions independently of concerns about the internal consistency, rhetorical persuasiveness, and generic conformity of legal reasoning. Judges should appreciate how the form and structure of unreliable narration can work against the opinions' own purposes by preventing readers from making the right judgment. If they do so, judges should find that their opinions will be more acceptable to readers and that readers' understanding of their opinions will be more acceptable or credible to enforcing powers than before. This argument calls for greater openness, honesty, and transparency in judicial writing-a new, self-referential language that embraces the subjective and contextual nature of legal adjudication-to mitigate the risks of interpretive disconnect between authors, readers, and their enforcers. In practice, this means that judges should not feign omniscience or pretend to the form and structure of objectivity, but simply write their personal best. Judges might aspire to something greater than the sum total of their experiences, but in doing so they should critically reflect on what is external to the self, disclose their preconceptions at the outset, and try to tell stories that make best sense of their worlds. 106 If judges acknowledged their limitations and admitted the ways that they could have impacted their narrative ordering processes, readers could remain alert for deviations before and while they read their reasons, identify and resolve these deviations before interpreting them, and reach a better understanding of the correct meanings that enforcing powers are likely to apply. This would also reveal other meanings (and issues and interests and voices) that could not be expressed using the standard linguistic and semiotic forms, narrative qualities, or common law structures as they are currently constituted, providing the basis for further and more principled critique.
For instance, could conventional judicial discourse, being a form of narrative, favour certain aspects of human experience over others? Whose perspectives are included and whose perspectives are left out? 107 What kinds of wordless knowledge, cognitively organized through narrative but rarely communicated as such, do judges rely on in determining a witness's credibility or in making discretionary decisions? Whose perspectives determine the content of this wordless knowledge and how should they be accounted for in legal writing? 108 are the effects of standpoint biases and other subjective influences on the judicial decision-making process? How are these influences leveraged for and against the goals of increased procedural fairness, substantive equality, cultural diversity, and distributional justice? 109 Considered in the broadest terms, how might the use of narrative, and the interdisciplinary study of narratology, be creatively and productively mobilized in law toward socially progressive ends? 110 
Apologia
Crime fictions and judicial opinions show how easily readers may be deceived by narrators acting the part of propriety. Clinging to the promise of secure communication ignores how individual influences can shape readers' interpretations in meaningful ways. These narratives further illustrate the diversity and dynamism of unreliability as a technique, operative through various interactive disguises with the consequence that there may be no essential textual quality that marks a story's meaning as objectively intelligible and accessible.
Perhaps the most subversive implication of this kind of analysis is the extent to which unreliable narration may inhabit not only representative works in the crime fiction and judicial opinion genres, but other authoritative texts across a variety of disciplines claiming sacrosanctity, including religious writings. 111 Consider this article's epigraph. Questions abound in the theological sciences as to the proper ordering of the Gospels, such that not even their meanings are without serious uncertainty. That one should turn briefly now to focus on scholarly articles, including this one, seems a natural step.
When reading a scholarly article, readers make value judgments that are based on their assumptions about various aspects of the text, including the credentials of the author, prestige of the journal, structure of the argument, and clarity and complexity of the language. These are indicia of reliability in academic circles. 112 What if an author in this context sets out to imitate history, to mimic the forms of footnote reference to cases and other legal authorities that can be cited about happenings in the past, to perpetrate a narrative illusion on his readers? 113 Consider, for example, an author who embellishes, mischaracterizes, or invents details in an article to achieve a desired effect; who changes a judge's name to match the pseudonym Christie adopted during the eleven days she mysteriously disappeared in the year Roger Ackroyd was published;
114 who gives the accused in Lodge the same address as his childhood home; who makes the alleged crime occur on his date of birth; who gives the accused, "Bob Lodge," an anagram of his last name; who gives the complainant, "D.D.," his initials; whose cites the Lodge case to a law reporter which does not exist; who holds back the real reason for the judgment's historical obscurity; and who completely imagines the Lodge case which has no basis in reality at all.
If the author intends that his readers will make the right judgment about the value of the article, he should confess his unreliability at the outset. Readers could then take him at his word that, the references to Lodge aside, the author has done everything that he could, honestly and forthrightly despite the constraints of his perspective, to convince them of his argument about attempting reliability. Or perhaps the uncertainty will be too great. His narrative will signify things in ways the author could not have expected, suggesting meanings in addition to or instead of his own, as if Sheppard's rows of stars cluttered the pages, and may lead readers to question the objective quality of texts operating within similar generic conventions as scholarly writing. Readers may be left with nothing but a call to read the article critically and reflexively, as they would a potentially unreliable work of crime fiction, in their attempts to solve the mystery of legal interpretation.
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113. See generally Keen, supra note 3 at 128-40 (explaining the narrative mechanics of fiction taking the form of non-fiction). One of the most spectacular examples of revealed-to-be fictional academic "nonfiction" is Glenn Boyer's edited memoir of Josephine Earp, which was discovered nearly twenty years after its original publication by a respected university press to be "creative nonfiction" having a "fictional format." See Glenn G Boyer, I Married Wyatt Earp: The Recollections of Josephine Sarah Marcus Earp (University of Arizona Press, 1976). 114. Roger Ackroyd was published in spring of 1926. The year was a tumultuous one for Christie, as it had become plain that her marriage to Archie Christie so badly deteriorated that he was publicly carrying on an affair with another woman, Ms. Nancy Neele. On December 3, 1926, after Archie had left to visit Ms. Neele for the weekend, Christie packed her bags and drove off. Her car was found the next morning abandoned on an embankment covered in frost. Inside the car, the police found a small case, women's clothing, and driving license bearing Christie's name. The newspapers were soon ablaze with speculation about the writer's disappearance. The Daily News even offered a sizable reward for information leading to Christie's discovery. By the following weekend, police officers from four counties and thousands of volunteers had become involved in the search. On the evening of December 14, 1926, Christie was recognized as a guest at the Hydropathic Hotel in Harrogate where she had checked in under the name of Ms. Teresa Neele, claiming to be a visitor from South Africa. When asked by a Daily News reporter how she had got to Harrogate, Christie said that she did not know and that she was suffering from amnesia. Archie Christie positively identified his wife, announcing in the press that she had suffered near complete memory loss, which statement was later corroborated by two doctors. However, this did not stop the press from accusing Christie of having planned her disappearance to obtain publicity. Christie makes no direct reference to her disappearance in her autobiography, stating merely that after illness came sorrow and heartbreak, and that there was no need to dwell on it. 
